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The Stream of Consciousness and
the Epochal Theory of Time
Maria Teresa Teixeira
1 William James is widely known as one of the theorizers of pragmatism, and also for his
pioneering  work  on  consciousness.  Jamesian  pragmatism  relates  to  the  rejection  of
intellectualism,  and  from an  early  stage  to  the  notion  of  thought,  or  consciousness
depicted as a continuous flux, like a “river” or a “stream.”1 Later in his philosophical
development, James also pictured the world as something unfinished that flows and keeps
growing.
2 In William James’s philosophy, rationalism is contrasted to pragmatism: “for rationalism
reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in
the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.”2 What emerges then is
what is still in the making, not what is completed and pre-established. Real existence
consists of real things, which are in the process of coming into being. We can actually
apprehend these things that are ‘still in the making’ by a stroke of intuition. But they are
not ready-made and clear-cut; also, they do not lie about awaiting our appropriation of
them. Reality is a process of coming into being, a flux that unravels itself so that it can
achieve its own existence. Reality “mounts in living its own undivided life – it buds and
burgeons, changes and creates.”3 
3 William James can thus be considered as one of the forefathers of process philosophy. His
philosophy was certainly an enduring inspiration for other process philosophers such as
Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead, and it gave rise to a new literary genre: the
stream-of-consciousness novel.  We can count Virginia Woolf,  James Joyce and Marcel
Proust as some of the most illustrious writers who have explored this technique.
4 In The Principles of Psychology consciousness and its temporal succession are presented as a
continuous stream. Thought is in a continual change. James depicts thought as something
that “goes on”:4 “Within each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly continuous.”5 He says
that “continuous” should be defined as “that which is without breach, crack, or division.”
Consciousness  cannot  be  divided  into  bits;  on  the  contrary,  it  flows  like  a  stream.
However, we can identify different states of consciousness within the flow. But they are
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not external or contiguous to one another. There is a relatedness that accounts for the
continuity of the flow of consciousness, although there is no recurrence of the same state
of consciousness. This is the reason why we never think the same thing twice. James
anticipates  here  what  will  be  established  later  in  the  philosophies  of  Bergson  and
Whitehead’s as the irreversibility of time.
5 In chapter IX of his Principles of Psychology, entitled “The Stream of Thought” he writes:
Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a
resemblance of kind with other thoughts of the same fact. When the identical fact
recurs, we must think of it in a fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different
angle, apprehend it in different relations from those in which it last appeared.6 
6 Every state of consciousness is different from every other state of consciousness; there
are no frozen,  permanent thoughts making their  appearance every now and then in
consciousness. Also, every thought is a novel state of consciousness, no matter how close
it may resemble other thoughts. Recognition is the effort of bringing into consciousness
an old idea, so that it can be the “same” idea. This effort must be considered as something
extra that adds on to the original idea and thereby introduces novelty.
7 The  early James  thus  seems  to  consider  memory  as  a  psychological  effort  that
reconstructs an old idea. We will see later that, from the very beginning, the idea of an
ontological  past  is  implicit  to  James’s  philosophy  in  so  far  as  he  emphasises  the
introduction of  novelty in his  temporal  stream of  consciousness.  Novelty is  indeed a
character of temporality;  novel temporal states emerge from an ontological past that
constitutes them in absolute novelty. However, James only admits to an ontological past
in his late writings as a consequence of Bergson’s influence.
8 The novel states of consciousness that emerge can be identified and individualized. They
seem to crack the stream of consciousness if we consider them as independent units. In
fact, they are discrete units and exhibit a character of discontinuity. However, the flow of
consciousness persists; distinctness does not break the continuous, ongoing activity of
consciousness. “A silence may be broken by a thunder-clap, and we may be stunned and
confused for a moment by the shock as to give no instant account to ourselves of what
has happened. But the very confusion is a mental state, and a state that passes us straight
over from the silence to the sound. The transition between the thought of one object and
the thought of another is no more a break in the thought than a joint in a bamboo is a
break in the wood. It is a part of the consciousness as much as the joint is a part of the
bamboo.”7
9 James compares the stream of our consciousness to a bird’s life “made of an alternation of
flights and perchings.”8 Also he calls “the resting-places the ‘substantive parts,’and places of
flight the ‘transitive parts,’ of the stream of thought.”9 These transitive parts i.e. the places of
flight of the flux account for the unity of thought. This metaphor has frequently been
misinterpreted.
10 Henri Bergson criticised this distinction in a letter he wrote to William James in January
1903,10 and in another one he wrote to Floris Delattre years later in 1923.11 He writes that
in his durée réelle there is no flight, and no rest. In other words, there is no instantaneous
immobility,  no static places of  rest.  Only transition is  real.  Reality is  continuous and
indivisible change. He considers the stream of thought to have a psychological nature,
whereas his durée is metaphysical. Bergson’s criticism seems to draw a line between his
durée réelle and James’s stream of thought.
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11 On a closer examination,  however,  Bergson’s durée is  in fact quite near the Jamesian
stream  of  thought.  The  resting-places  in  the  stream  of  consciousness  cannot  be
considered as “breaks in the thought.” There are no “cracks” in the stream of thought,
only soft patterns and stream-flows. On the other hand, Bergson’s continuous flux is not
homogeneous  and  its  continuity  should  not  be  confused  with  the  mathematical
continuity of time, which is not true duration. It is but an endless repetition of the same
mathematical element. The Bergsonian continuous flux is a dynamic continuity; also, the
heterogeneity  of  duration  is  the  true  character  of  reality.  Different  states  of
consciousness succeed one another introducing thereby novelty in this continuity. Hence,
there are no two identical states of consciousness; they always differ even when they
exhibit a close resemblance. For duration carries novelty within itself. James’s resting-
places in the stream of consciousness are thus comparable to the heterogeneity of the
durée réelle.
12 Bergson seems to acknowledge this argument in his preface to the French translation of
William James’s  work  on  Pragmatism.  He  writes:  “To  be  sure,  our  experience  is  not
incoherent.  At  the  same  time  as  it  presents  us  with  things  and  facts  it  shows  us
relationships between the things and connections between the facts: these relations are
as  real,  as  directly  observable,  according  to  William  James,  as  the  things  and  facts
themselves. But the relations are fluctuating and the things fluid. This is vastly different from
that dry universe constructed by the philosophers with elements that are clear-cut and
well-arranged, where each part is not only linked to another part, as experience shows us,
but also, as our reason would have it, is coordinated to the whole.”12 The resting-places
are  now “the  things  that  are  fluid,”  and the  places of  flight  “the  relations  that  are
fluctuating.”  There  are  no  static  places  of  rest,  no  instantaneous  immobility;  things
endure in their inescapable, continuous flow. James’s stream of thought exhibits no clear-
cut  divisions;  the  succession  of  states  is  a  flow  from  one  state  to  the  next:
interpenetration, as Bergson would call it.
13 This  heterogeneous,  continuous  flow  can  be  described  as  epochal.  For  it  presents
discontinuities that can be identified as distinct phases in the flow of reality, which are
not to be considered as “cracks” in the stream. Process philosophers have developed
distinctive  epochal  theories  of  time.  William  James  argued  that  the  stream  of  our
experience comes in discrete durational units. Alfred North Whitehead held that “Time is
sheer  succession  of  epochal  durations.”13 Henri  Bergson  emphasized  the  qualitative
multiplicity  characterising  the  states  of  our  consciousness.  However,  all  three
conceptions of consciousness and temporality are quite close.
14 Bergson mostly emphasised continuity. He is often misinterpreted and his continuity is
taken  for  an  undifferentiated  flow  that  unravels  in  ceaseless  glide.  However,  the
Bergsonian flow is multifarious and does not preclude an abundant diversity of states of
consciousness. As the flow unravels, it carries all the indestructible past that is present to
the novel present that unrolls. The ontological past allows for the emergence of novelty;
the emergence of novelty is only possible because temporality is duration. Different states
of consciousness endure in such a way that their particular way of enduring characterises
and differentiates them absolutely. They draw on the indestructible past for their coming
into  being;  and  the  ontological  past  necessitates  the  emergence  of  the  novel  for  it
reinvents  itself  as  the  flow  of  consciousness  is  enriched  by  the  novel  states  of
consciousness. This heterogeneous flow is thus epochal; different states of consciousness
are  identifiable  although  they  are  not  clear-cut  and  separate.  The  Bergsonian  durée 
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endures and in so doing characterises absolutely each and every state of consciousness
that  cannot,  nevertheless,  be  separated  from  the  entire  flux.  Inseparability  and
heterogeneity thus describe epochal time.
15 Whitehead emphasises what he calls the atomic character of  reality.  He is also often
misinterpreted. Actual entities, the basic entities of reality, “the final real things” are of a
temporal nature; they become and perish because of their temporal nature. This is often a
point where some commentators grossly misinterpret Whiteheadian philosophy. They
confuse the atomicity of becoming with clear-cut fixity, the indivisibility of becoming
with the subsequent coordinate analysis of the actual entity that has attained satisfaction,
i.e. completion. Actual entities are “drops of experience”; as such they are individualised
and become as indivisible wholes. Their atomic character lies in their individualisation
and their indivisibility. Each entity is said to be an epochal duration for it is temporal and
individualised. “The epochal duration is not realised via its successive divisible parts, but is
given with its parts.”14 Once actual entities have become as temporal wholes, they perish
subjectively; but they also become transcendent and are thus objectively immortal. This
means that the past is immortal and forever irrevocable. It will be the data for future
actual entities,  i.e.  the next actual occasions will  prehend previous entities and grow
together  to  form  a  novel  entity.  Prehension  is  appropriation.  Novel  actual  entities
appropriate the past so that they can become into a totally novel synthesis. The past is
constitutive of novel entities and thus reveals its ontological nature. It conditions them
although it does not determine them in an absolute way.
16 Whitehead  and  Bergson’s  ontological  pasts  are  very  similar:  irrevocability  and
indestructibility result from novelty that is ever present in the temporal unravelling of
reality. This new concept of temporality greatly diverges from the traditional notion of
time that seems to originate from Saint Augustine. In Augustine’s doctrine the past does
not seem to be indestructible, nor does it seem to have any existence because past things
cannot be found anywhere: “For if there are times past and future, I wish to know where
they are. But if I have not yet succeeded in this, I still know that wherever they are, they
are not there as future or past, but as present. For if they are there as future, they are
there as ‘not yet’; if they are there as past, they are there as ‘no longer.’ Wherever they
are and whatever they are they exist therefore only as present.”15 Only the present seems
to have existence: the past is there “no longer” and the future is not there yet. However,
Augustine seems to identify some coexistence of the present with the past when he names
three distinct times as: “a time present of things past; a time present of things present;
and a time present of things future.”16 He also emphasises that the three times coexist in
the soul and that the “time present of things past” is memory. In a certain sense, we could
say that Augustine’s  memory is  already ontological  for he seems to be aware that it
constitutes present beings. Also, the present seems to have a certain thickness because, in
a certain sense, it coexists with the past and tends to already include an expectant future.
17 Temporality and continuity are thus important themes in process philosophy. James’s
philosophy as a philosophy of process is not a philosophy of substances, or a philosophy
of things. He is mainly concerned with time, change and discontinuity. James’s analysis
tries  to  find  out  if  the  additions  to  the  existing  reality  have  a  continuous,  or  a
discontinuous nature. One could say this is the founding inquiry concerning the epochal
theory of time. Indeed the inquiry about continuity and discontinuity is an ever-present
question in almost all philosophies of process. Zeno’s famous arguments against motion
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and  its  paradoxes  are  an  old  favourite  of  Western  philosophy,  and  also  of  process
philosophies.
18 William James discusses the question of  discontinuity as  well  as  Zeno’s  paradoxes in
chapters X and XI of his Some Problems of  Philosophy,17 both entitled “Novelty and the
Infinite.” He writes: “On the discontinuity-theory, time, change, etc., would grow by finite
buds or drops, either nothing coming at all,  or certain units of amount bursting into
being ‘at a stroke’.”18 In other words, reality either grows by abrupt units of being that
emerge by a single action, which is an addition of novelty, or it does not grow at all. These
novel  additions  to  reality  are  finite  and  indivisible.  However,  due  to  the  excessive
intellectualism of our ways of thinking, we tend to consider that novel additions to reality
are a set of infinite, innumerable steps, which can always be divided into ever-smaller
units.
19 Nevertheless, reality can be said to have an atomistic constitution, but only in the sense
that there are whole, indivisible units of duration and extension that come into being at
one stroke. Reality has a discrete composition, and our knowledge of reality grows by
“buds,” or “drops” of experience. We either have an experience that is whole and given
by  a  single  action,  or  we  have  no  experience  at  all.  Jamesian atomism  (as  well  as
Whiteheadian atomism) should not be misunderstood. The units that compose reality are
atomic because they are undivided and individualized. The discrete constitution of reality
does not allow for divisibility ad infinitum. Atoms are undivided and indivisible wholes;
also, they are complex syntheses.
20 The  question  of  continuity  and  discontinuity  is  an  old  inquiry  that  has  haunted
philosophy for centuries.  Zeno,  the Eleatic was the first to formulate the question of
divisibility ad infinitum. He was primarily concerned with showing that motion did not
really exist. Zeno’s paradox of the flying arrow attempts to demonstrate that if the arrow
occupies successive points in space, its motion is nothing more than a sum of its positions
in space; thus truly the arrow does not move. As Aristotle had already pointed out, “the
flying arrow is at rest.”19 William James states: “If a flying arrow occupies at each point a
determinate point of space, its motion becomes nothing but a sum of rests, for it exists
not, out of any point; and in the point it doesn’t move.”20
21 In  the  Achilles  paradox,  Achilles’  race  to  overtake  the  tortoise  is  also  reduced  to  a
collection of successive points with no extension or duration. According to Zeno, Achilles
never manages to overtake the tortoise because he must occupy all the successive points
where the tortoise has been positioned. Each time he gets to the tortoise’s last position,
the tortoise has already moved to a next successive point. So Achilles, in order to catch
the tortoise, would have to do the incredible thing of reaching the end of an endless
series.
22 The  mathematical  notion  of  a  continuum (not  to  be  confused  with  a  qualitative  or
dynamic continuum) arises from Zeno’s paradoxes. The mathematical continuum can be
infinitely divided. It is composed of exterior, contiguous elements, endlessly repeated. It
differs from a qualitative continuum, such as James’s stream of thought or Bergson’s
continuity of change in that it does not allow for novelty and real duration. In the real
world there are no small intervals of time that can be divided ad infinitum, no instants
without any duration, which would be the only truly indivisible units of time. Time has
thickness; there is no infinite divisibility of time, no mathematical instant corresponding
to the present. In his Principles of Psychology, James describes duration: 
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The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a
stern, as it were – a rearward-and a forward-looking end. It is only as parts of this
duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the other is perceived. We
do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception of
the succession infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of
time as a whole, with its two ends embedded in it. The experience is from the out-
set a synthetic datum, not a simple one; and to sensible perception its elements are
inseparable, although attention looking back may easily decompose the experience,
and distinguish its beginning from its end.21
23 As we have said, James metaphorically refers these units of duration as “drops or buds” of
experience; they are also “pulses” of reality.22 These units of duration, which make up
time, are whole, finite and indivisible. If they were otherwise, if those drops of experience
included a changing process, then again we would have Zeno’s paradox and their process
of being could never be completed. If time were infinitely divisible, as is required by our
intellectualist  logic,  then,  we  would  not  be  able  to  reach  the  end  of  any  temporal
experience, like Achilles and the tortoise: 
That being should immediately and by finite quantities add itself  to being,  may
indeed be  something which an onlooking intellect  fails  to  understand;  but  that
being should  be  identified  with the consummation of  an endless  chain of  units
(such as points), no one of which contains any amount whatever of the being (such
as “space”) expected to result, this is something which our intellect not only fails to
understand, but which it finds absurd.23
24 If time were infinitely divisible it could not elapse, for no end could be reached. No matter
how much time had already passed, before the remainder could elapse, the earlier part of
it should first pass; the earlier half should always elapse first, so that no end could ever be
reached. This can be expressed by the convergent series: 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16…
25 James solves this problem of the “infinite regress” in Zeno’s paradoxes by postulating an
epochal theory of time; he proposes that time comes in discrete units of duration, which
are whole,  indivisible and unchanging. If  they were not so,  i.e.  if  they were an ever-
changing divisible process, time would again appear to be a mathematical continuum
made of tautological repetitions.
26 Units  of  duration,  also  called  epochs  by  Alfred  North  Whitehead,  are  changeless
indivisible wholes that succeed each other. They are, all of them, diverse wholes that
introduce  novelty  into  reality. Whitehead  expresses  this  unchangeable  nature  of
durational wholes in his own peculiar phraseology: “Actual entities perish, but do not
change; they are what they are.”24 He also writes: “There is a becoming of continuity, but
no continuity of becoming.”25
27 Whitehead’s  interpretation of  Zeno’s  paradoxes is  based on James’s  approach.  White-
head emphasises the mathematical solution of Zeno’s paradoxes, but still he maintains
that these sophisms endanger mainly our treatment of becoming and time.26 Whitehead
says that, according to Zeno, every act of becoming requires an immediate predecessor.
However, this need for an immediate predecessor implies an additional premise that is
not found in Zeno’s paradoxes. Instead, there is a “vicious infinite regress,” which can
only be over-come by postulating an epochal theory of time. Durational units are atomic,
in the sense that they are whole, indivisible, complex, individualized, and changeless;
becoming is by its very nature changeless: “there is a becoming of continuity, but no
continuity  of  becoming.”  Becoming  implies  the  rejection  of  its  own  divisibility  and
change whilst becoming proceeds, as well as the constitution of a novel individual entity: 
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The conclusion is that in every act of becoming there is the becoming of something
with temporal extension; but the act itself is not extensive, in the sense that it is
divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming which correspond to the extensive
divisibility of what has become.27 
28 Thus  the  temporal  process is  a  process  of  wholeness:  “The  epochal  duration  is  not
realised via its successive divisible parts, but given with its parts.”28
29 In  Whitehead’s  philosophy,  the  indivisible  basic  temporal  unit,  the  actual  occasion
endures through a certain period. This endurance is its coming into being; it is also its
own effect of distinctiveness, i.e. the actual occasion becomes as it is because it has its
own particular way of becoming, it has its own period of becoming and being. Each actual
occasion is an epoch, i.e. an arrest. This arrest is comparable to James’s places of rest; it is
not  a  break  in  the  continuity  of  reality,  but  it  allows  for  individualization.  Actual
occasions are individuals, even though they are not external to each other. The passage of
things is not “a mere linear procession of discrete entities.”29 Discreteness is indeed a
character of actual occasions, but there is no linearity in their process of coming into
being. Durational units can thus be individualized; that is the very reason why they are
atomic and epochal.
30 Nevertheless, Whitehead’s discontinuities do not imply the denial of continuity between
actual occasions. They do imply, however, that the process of constitution of an actual
occasion is  not divisible into other component processes which would be themselves
actual occasions. In other words, becoming is not composed of other acts of becoming.
31 The process of becoming does not occur in time because it is the very creation of time;
the act of becoming is whole and indivisible. Becoming is not included in a pre-existing
container where it can come about at a certain instant. Rather it is a temporal epoch that
is created by its process of coming into being; temporal epochs have duration, and are not
instantaneous. Their completion supplies them with actuality, but their distinctiveness
and individualization comes from their durational nature, which defines and determines
their coming into being. Once they have become, actual occasions, which we could also
call durational units, perish and are prehended or appropriated by other novel actual
occasions,  which thus initiate  their  own process  of  becoming.  Time unveils  “a  sheer
succession of epochal durations,” but it is by its very nature incomplete. Novel actual
entities succeed one another so that process is never completed; indeed it could not be so,
for it would not be process otherwise. The Whiteheadian epochal theory of time implies
that every actual occasion has a spatial volume; it atomizes reality but does not break it
into pieces, neither does it crack continuity.30 For “there is a becoming of continuity.”
32 Bergson  also  examines  Zeno’s  paradoxes.  Bergson  is  mainly  concerned  with  the
indivisibility of motion. He states that Achilles does not occupy the successive positions
occupied by the tortoise. He does not fall into step with the tortoise; he simply runs and
over-takes it. Bergson does not consider the mathematical solution, which deals with a
sum of the infinite geometric series that results in a finite number,31 nor is he concerned
with the question of infinite regress and infinite divisibility. He holds that Achilles steps
differ from the steps of the tortoise. Achilles’ steps do not reproduce the steps of the
tortoise; neither does Achilles follow up the exact positions of the tortoise. He simply
runs and overtakes it! Achilles does not occupy the successive points in space occupied by
the tortoise. Bergson writes: “All points of space necessarily being fixed, I must be careful
not to attribute to the moving object itself the immobility of the point with which it
coincides […] How can a progress coincide with a thing, a movement with an immobility?”32
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In Creative Evolution, Bergson again considers Zeno’s paradoxes: “At bottom, illusion arises
from  this,  that  the  movement,  once  effected,  has  laid  along  its  course  a  motionless
trajectory on which we can count as many immobilities as we will. From this we conclude
that the movement, whilst being effected, lays at each instant beneath it a position with
which it coincides. We do not see that the trajectory is created in one stroke, although a
certain time is required for it; and that though we can divide at will the trajectory once
created, we cannot divide its creation, which is an act in progress and not a thing.”33
Bergson distinguishes real movement from the motionless trajectory along its course,
which can be drawn after the movement is completed. Motion is whole and indivisible; it
takes  time  and  flows  uninterruptedly;  the  line  of  its  trajectory  is  a  mere  post-
representation  of  a  durational  reality.  Duration  is  in  fact  the  primordial  fact
characterizing reality.
33 Thus, as we said above, Bergson’s durée can also be considered as epochal. The continuous
flow of reality seems to preclude temporal units distinguishable from each other. But the
continuous  flow  is  made  up  of  states  of  consciousness  that  interpenetrate  and  are
referred  to  as  “states,”  even  though  they  are  not  external  to  each  other.  Lack  of
externality does not mean absence of distinctness. Rather it means there is a qualitative
multiplicity. In Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson writes: 
Shall we say that this duration has unity? Undoubtedly a continuity of elements
prolonged into one another partakes of unity as much as it does of multiplicity. But
this moving, changing, coloured and living unity scarcely resembles the abstract
unity, empty and motionless, which the concept of pure unity circumscribes.34 
34 Duration is  thus  qualitative  and heterogeneous.  In  consciousness  we find states  that
succeed each other and melt into one another.35
35 Thus duration is continuous but it also consists of discrete units, which can be designated
as epochs. There are different rhythms of duration that can be identified as temporal
units, each one diverse from the other. In Matter and Memory, Bergson writes: 
In  reality  there  is  no  one  rhythm  of  duration;  it  is  possible  to  imagine  many
different  rhythms  which,  slower  or  faster,  measure  the  degree  of  tension  or
relaxation  of  different  kinds  of  consciousness,  and  thereby  fix  their  respective
places in the scale of being.36 
36 Each rhythm of duration, we could say, is a temporal unit, for it defines each creature
absolutely  providing  it  with  its  own  way  of  being,  which  is  of  durational  nature.
Rhythmical entities require the existence of discrete units; for without them there would
be no rhythm. These rhythms can thus be identified, and although they are continuous
within the flow of reality, they are distinguishable from one another. They can thus be
considered as  epochal.  In  Bergson’s  philosophy the  epochs  emerge as  the  successive
interpenetrating states of consciousness; they are time as it is lived by our consciousness.
37 Consciousness is the Bergsonian paradigm for duration of all entities. Bergson extends
the application of  the notion of  consciousness to the material  world to point up the
similarity  between  different  levels  of  duration.  This  analogy  should  not  be
misunderstood; neither should it be taken in a literal sense. Whitehead found a better
term to express the same thing: “prehension.” He too conceives the ultimate elements of
matter with a vibratory character. Bergson and Whitehead tried to express that matter,
as well as life have duration. Matter endures in a much quicker rhythm than the rhythm
of  our  consciousness.  Our  perception of  the  world  involves  the  contraction of  these
material vibrations and thus reconciles the different modes of enduring. Every creature
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endures and has, therefore, an elementary level of memory, which Bergson designates,
borrowing from Espinoza, as ‘mensmomentanea.’ This ontology of matter precludes the
instantaneous and establishes reality as undeniably epochal. “All duration has thickness;
real time has no instants.”37
38 William James also holds that creatures differ amongst themselves in accordance with
duration.38 Their “specious present” may be more, or less contracted. His notion of the
“specious  present”  asserts,  “The  unit  of  composition  of  our  perception  of  time  is  a
duration.”39 James borrows the idea of the ‘specious present’ from E. R. Clay: “Time, then,
considered relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts,  viz.,  the obvious
past,  the  specious  present,  the  real  present,  and  the  future.  Omitting  the  specious
present, it consists of three […] nonentities – the past, which does not exist, the future,
which does not exist,  and their conterminous,  the present;  the faculty from which it
proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious present.”40 The “specious present” is a
misleading designation for it suggests that the present lived by our consciousness is not
truly real.  According to E. R. Clay the real  present is  the instantaneous mathematical
present. If each fraction of time is infinitely divisible into smaller and smaller elements,
we can but conclude that the real present is an instant without duration and thus the
existing present is instantaneous. Indeed, what is true is the very opposite: the so-called
“specious present” is the time lived by our consciousness that has always some thickness,
and  its  own  determined  rhythm.  Real  time  is  epochal  whether  endured  by  our
consciousness, or by matter. Otherwise, it would not be real time.
39 For Bergson, as well as for James and Whitehead the present is not an instant without
duration. The present time has thickness; it endures and thus relates to the past. In his
Principles of Psychology, James writes: “Duration and events together form our intuition of the
specious present with its content.”41 It is worthy to note that in James’s doctrine duration
does not yet coincide with events, as it does in Whitehead’s philosophy, or with the flux
of consciousness, as it does in Bergson’s theory. He states: 
the distinctly intuited present merges into a penumbra of mere dim recency before
it turns into the past which is simply reproduced and conceived. […] This sense of
recencyis a feeling sui generis,  and may affect things that happened hours ago. It
would seem to show that their brain-processes are still in a state modified by the
foregoing excitement, still in a “fading” phase, in spite of the long interval.42 
40 James distinguishes two pasts: one that is “directly intuited” and another that is “simply
reproduced and conceived.” The former correlates with primary memory, the latter with
“memory proper or secondary memory.” This distinction is important because it asserts
that the only true past is the one that mingles with the specious present, and in a certain
way  coincides  with  it;  also,  it  seems  to  depend  wholly  on  material  brain-processes,
without which the “fading” phase would be impossible. The sense of “recency” is the
main feature of this kind of memory. On the other hand, “memory proper” is always
indirect recall: recollection is not a past state, but a present one that succeeds a past state
that has for ever vanished. Consequently, recollection is a present state that is completely
external  to  the past  state  that  originated it;  the past  state  no longer exists  and the
recollection is simply a similar duplicate that exists in the present.
41 The past not directly apprehended is dead and gone; it has no ontological existence, even
though it may leave behind material traces in the brain. The stream of consciousness thus
seems to flow into nonentity. The past is not integrated into the stream; the different
states simply fade away and vanish.
The Stream of Consciousness and the Epochal Theory of Time
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-1 | 2011
9
42 When we consider other process philosophies we will find that the past has a different
status. Bergson holds that the past engulfs the new states of consciousness and preserves
them, so that every novel state incorporates every previous state. He stresses the flux of
reality as well as the persistence of the past, which is carried by it. The Bergsonian durée 
carries novelty within itself as it creates reality; and it pursues its course carrying all the
indestructible  past.  The  past  is  present  to  the  present;  Gilles  Deleuze  speaks  of  a
contemporaneity of the present with the past in Bergson’s philosophy.43 Also, the past
preserves itself because it endures: 
But only then did I become aware of the fact that inward experience in the pure
state, in giving us a “substance” whose very essence is to endure and consequently
continually to prolong into the present an indestructible past, would have relieved
me from seeking, and would even have forbidden me to seek, where memories are
preserved. They preserve themselves […].44 
43 Memory is by its very essence duration; so there is no place really where we can find it.
This is the reason why Bergson holds that pure memory is immaterial and cannot be
found in the brain: 
To make the brain the depository of the past,  to imagine in the brain a certain
region in which the past, once past, dwells, is to commit a psychological error, to
attribute a scientific value to a distinction entirely practical, for there is no exact
moment when the present becomes the past, nor consequently when perception
becomes recollection.45 
44 The fact that the past is present to the present does not allow for any exactness in the
distinction of present and past, neither does it permit of any real local- ization. The flow
of consciousness, although uninterrupted, preserves the whole past within itself. 
I  believe  that  our  whole  psychical  existence  is  something  just  like  this  single
sentence, continued since the first awakening of consciousness, interspersed with
commas, but never broken by full stops. And consequently I believe that our whole
past still exists. It exists subconsciously […].46 
45 The flow of consciousness, which is whole, is also epochal; its indivisibility attests to the
indestructibility of the past,  which can nevertheless be identified in different epochs.
Also, Bergson considers that it can manifest itself in its wholeness as a present experience
(cf.  the  near-death  experience  of  life-review).  This  manifestation  is  of  psychological
nature, although the past itself is ontological.
46 Conversely, James seems to admit only present mental states, for he seems to deny any
ontological status to the past considering only conscious states directly intuited.
47 So far, in the treatment of memory, we have but referred the early philosophy of William
James. However, in our previous analysis of the stream of consciousness we considered
the  later  James  and  concluded  that  the  addition  of  discrete  elements  to  reality
characterizes a stream of thought without any breaks. We also spoke of recognition as the
effort of bringing into consciousness an old idea so that it can be the “same” idea. This
effort was then considered as a new addition that introduced novelty; novel states of
consciousness could be identified as distinct from each other, but they did not break the
stream that persisted in its flow. We also quoted in favour of our theory from James’s late
work,  although we could already find our  argument  in  Principles  of  Psychology,  in  its
chapter on the stream of thought, from which we also quoted. We can now say that the
introduction of novel, discrete additions in the stream of consciousness, in some way,
attests  to the persistence of  an ontological  past  and the irreversibility of  time,  even
though James is not clear about this point and sometimes even contradicts it.
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48 Also we can resort to James’s works on mysticism to find there an ontological, subliminal
memory that seems to surpass Bergson’s indestructible past and Whitehead’s immortality
of the past. In The Varieties of Religious Experience James refers the subconscious self as a
“psychological entity.” He quotes from Myers’s essay on subliminal consciousness that
establishes that the self is far more extensive than it can know or manifest. James then
comes to the conclusion that: “the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self
through which saving experiences come, […] is literally and objectively true as far as it goes.”47
Here William James comes quite close to Sri Aurobindo’s concept of subliminal memory: 
The  surface  memory  itself  is  a  fragmentary  and  ineffective  action  pulling  out
details  from an inner subliminal  memory which receives and records all  world-
experience, receives and records even what the mind has nor observed, understood
or noticed. Our surface imagination is a selection from a vaster more creative and
effective  subliminal  image-building  power  of  consciousness.  A  mind  with
immeasurably  wider  and  more  subtle  perceptions,  a  life-energy  with  a  greater
dynamism,  a  subtle-physical  substance  with  a  larger  and  finer  receptivity  are
building out of themselves our surface evolution. A psychic entity is there behind
these occult activities which is the true support of our individualisation.48
49 In  his  late  life, near  to  his  death  James  wrote  a  paper  called  “A  Suggestion  about
Mysticism”49 where he overtly accepts Bergson indestructible past and its ontological
character. He refers the field of consciousness in a somewhat Bergsonian style: 
The present field as a whole came continuously out of its predecessor and will melt
into its successor as continuously again, one sensation-mass passing into another
sensation-mass and giving the character of  a  gradually  changing present to the
experience, while the memories and concepts carry time-coefficients which place
whatever is present in a temporal perspective more or less vast.50 
50 Time is now real and responsible for the introduction of novelty. In a way it extends the
temporality of the stream of consciousness, where novelty was already implied but not
wholly developed. This extension depends on the recognition of the status of memory as
ontological and constitutive of the different creatures.
51 It is not surprising then to find that that Whitehead’s doctrine on time and creativity
borrows  a  lot  from  James’s  theory.  Whitehead’s  actual  entities  become  and  perish
subjectively but remain forever as objectively immortal. Their perishing is a means of
objectification,  so that  they can be apprehended and incorporated in the ontological
constitution of their successors. This alternate perishing and coming into being is known
as process. It is a creative activity for each actual entity that comes into being is self-
creating, although it draws from its predecessors. “The notion of prehension of the past
means that the past is an element which perishes and thereby remains an element in the
state beyond, and thus is objectified.”51 Consequently novelty is always introduced into
process; it goes on indefinitely and is never complete. 
Thus each actual  entity,  although incomplete so far as concerns its  microscopic
process, is yet incomplete by reason of its objective inclusion of the macroscopic
process.  It  really  experiences  a  future  which  must  be  actual,  although  the
completed actualities of that future are undetermined. In this sense, each actual
occasion experiences its objective immortality.52 
52 Incompleteness reveals itself in the determination of a future not yet determined but that
will be erected on the objective immortality of actual occasions.
53 Thus Whitehead’s past is ontological because it is constitutive of the actual entities; it is
also irrevocable like Bergson’s, and introduces novelty into reality.
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54 The philosophical theories of William James, Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead
are founded on the principle of process. The flow of reality is uninterrupted, but it is also
made of heterogeneous states that can be differentiated but not separated within the flux.
The ontological,  indestructible  past  adds novelty to reality for  it  refuses  tautological
repetition and unveils itself in the novelty of the present time.
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ABSTRACTS
The Jamesian notion of the ‘stream of consciousness’ is closely related to the epochal theory of
time. It also stems from an attempt to resolve the old aporia contained in Zeno’s paradoxes. Time
flows like a ‘river’ or a ‘stream,’ but still it grows by ‘drops’ or ‘buds.’ These basic units of time are
whole and indivisible, but they do not ‘crack’ or ‘divide’ reality. Other process philosophies also
include this notion of a continuous time that, nevertheless, integrates these interrelated units
that account for individualisation without any breach of continuity. Henri Bergson’s durée and
Alfred N. Whitehead’s epochal theory of time clearly illustrate this doctrine. The examination of
memory and the status of the past as a positive existence also emphasise the temporal aspect of
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